We study the asymmetric atomic selfish routing in ring networks, which has diverse practical applications in network design and analysis. We are concerned with minimizing the maximum latency of source-destination node-pairs over links with linear latencies. We obtain the first constant upper bound on the price of anarchy and significantly improve the existing upper bounds on the price of stability. Moreover, we show that any optimal solution is a good approximate Nash equilibrium. Finally, we present better performance analysis and fast implementation of pseudo-polynomial algorithms for computing approximate Nash equilibria.
Introduction
Recent trends in the analysis and design of network routing take into account rational and selfish behaviors of network users. Selfish routing [23] models network routing from a game-theoretic perspective, in which network users are viewed as independent players participating in a non-cooperative game. Each player, with his own pair of source and destination in the network, aims to establish a communication path (between his source and destination) along which he experiences latency as low as possible, given the link congestion caused by all the players. In the absence of a central authority who can impose and maintain globally efficient routing strategies on the network traffic [19] , network designers are often interested in a (pure) Nash equilibrium that is as close to the system optimum as possible, where the Nash equilibrium is a "stable state" among the players, from which no player has the incentive to deviate unilaterally. The notion of price of anarchy (PoA) (resp. price of stability (PoS)) was introduced in [17] (resp. [2] ) to capture the gap between the worst (resp. best) possible Nash equilibrium and the globally optimal solution. They respectively quantify the maximum and minimum penalties in network performance required to ensure a stable outcome.
The PoA and PoS of selfish routing depend on, among others, the network topologies, the number of players, the latency functions on network links, as well as the system and individual objectives. In on G is greater than h − 1, which turns to infinity as h → ∞. In light of this negative example, practical (undirected) network design has to pay much attention to selecting suitable topologies so that small PoS, as well as small PoA, can be guaranteed.
Secondly, rings have been a fundamental topology frequently encountered in communication networks, and attract considerable attention and efforts from the research community [3, 5, 6, 8, 24, 25] , especially in design of approximation algorithms for combinatorial optimization problems. Our study of selfish routing on the ring topology attempts not only to provide a good starting point for evaluating the PoA and PoS in asymmetric network congestion games, but also to enhance the diversity of network topologies amenable to the minimax criterion.
Thirdly, even in a ring, the problem of routing in response to communication requests is not trivial.
It has not been known until the present work whether the SRR admits a constant PoA. Upper bounds of 6.83 and 4.57 on the PoS respectively with linear latency and homogenous linear latency have been established in [9] . The authors have also proved the existence of an optimal solution which approximates a Nash equilibrium by a factor of 54. Improving these bounds or showing their tightness is very desirable for better quantifying the PoS and the instability of efficient solutions, which in turn will provide improved guidelines for achieving a good balance between stability and efficiency in the SRR network design.
Main contributions
With new ideas and techniques in addition to more elaborate analysis, we contribute to the study of the SRR and of atomic selfish routing in multi-commodity networks [4, 20] by proving four groups of main results: (1) The PoS is at most 3.9, which reduces to 3.5 for homogenous latency; ( 2) The PoA has a constant upper bound of 16; (3) Any optimal solution is a 9-approximate Nash equilibrium (see Definition 2.2); (4) A polynomial-time combinatorial algorithm and pseudo-polynomial-time convergence combined compute a (1, 11.7)-approximate Nash equilibrium (see Definition 2.2). In summary, our work provides a strong justification on more attractive features of the ring topology compared with general networks [12] , apart from simplicity and fault-tolerance of rings in real-world applications.
Paper organization The SRR model is formally defined and some basic properties are presented in Section 2. After evaluation of the PoS in Section 3 with improved bounds, we show in Section 4 a constant bound on the PoA. Then we prove in Section 5 the existence of (9, 1)-approximate Nash equilibria. In Section 6 we provide algorithms for finding good approximate Nash equilibria in pseudo-polynomial time.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7 with computational study of the PoS in the SRR of 2 players and 3 players, respectively, which shows that the corresponding PoSs are 1.25 and 1.26, respectively.
The selfish ring routing model
This section introduces the problem formulation, as well as concepts and notation to be used in the paper.
The basic properties of Nash equilibria established will play an important role in our theoretical proofs and algorithm design.
The model
Our selfish ring routing (SRR) model is specified by a triple (R, l, (s i , t i ) k i=1 ), usually called an SRR instance. As illustrated in Figure 2 , the underlying network is a ring R = (V, E), an undirected cycle, with node set V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } of n nodes and link set E = {e i = v i v i+1 : i = 1, 2, . . . , n} of n links, where v n+1 = v 1 . By writing P ⊆ R, we mean that P is a subgraph of R (possibly R itself) with node set V (P ) and link set E(P ). Each link e ∈ E is associated with a load-dependent linear latency (function) l e (x) = a e x + b e , where a e , b e are nonnegative constants, and x is an integer variable indicating the load on e.
Without loss of generality, all a e and b e , e ∈ E, are assumed to be integers.
(2.1)
The latency l is said to be homogeneous if b e = 0 for all e ∈ E. There are k source-destination node
communication request for routing one unit of flow from his source s i ∈ V to his destination t i ∈ V , and his strategy set consists of two internally disjoint paths P i andP i in ring R with ends s i and t i satisfying
We setP i := P i for i = 1, 2, . . . , k. Different players may have the same source-destination pair, and A (feasible) routing f for the SRR instance is a 0-1 function f on multiset
In view of the correspondence between f and player strategies adopted for the SRR instance, we abuse the notation slightly by writing f = {Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q k } with the understanding that, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , k, the one unit of flow requested by player i is routed along path Q i ∈ {P i ,P i }, and correspondingly f (Q i ) = 1 > 0 = f (Q i ). Also we write Q i ∈ f for i = 1, 2, . . . , k.
Each link e ∈ E bears a load with respect to f defined as the integer f e := ∑ P ∈P:e∈E(P ) f (P ) = |{Q i : e ∈ E(Q i ), i = 1, 2, . . . , k}| equal the number of paths in {Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q k } each of which go through e.
Every P ⊆ R is associated with a nonnegative integer l P (f ) :
which indicates roughly the total latencies of links on P experienced in f . (The wording "indicates roughly" changes to "equals" when every link of P is used by some player in the routing f .) Naturally, the maximum latencies experienced by individuals and the system are
where M i (f ) is the (maximum) latency of player i with respect to f (the "maximum" can be dropped in view that the routing is unsplittable), and M (f ) is the maximum latency of the routing f . A routing f * is optimal if M (f * ) is minimum among all routings for the SRR instance.
Approximate Nash equilibria
A Nash equilibrium is characterized by the property that no player has the incentive to change his strategy
Nash equilibrium or simply a Nash routing if
As a network congestion game [14] , the SRR possesses at least one Nash routing whose existence can be proved by using potential function Φ, defined as follows:
The domain of the potential function is the set of routings for the SRR instance. For routing f = {Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q k }, reversing the summations, the potential of f becomes
from which one can easily derive the following well-known result [21, 18] . 
Lemma 2.1 Let routingf result from routing f due to a single player i changing his adopted strategy (path). Then the following hold:
When α = 1, routing f is a Nash equilibrium, and thus also referred to as a (1, β)-Nash routing. In
), the price of stability (PoS) is defined as the minimum β for which (1, β)-Nash routing exists; and the price of anarchy (PoA) is defined as the minimum β for which every Nash routing is a (1, β)-Nash routing. The notions of the PoS and PoA extend to the SRR problem of all SRR instances, whose PoS (resp. PoA) is set to be the supremum of PoS (resp. PoA) over all SRR instances.
As an example, for the SRR instance depicted in Figure 2( 
Basic properties
We investigate Nash routings for an arbitrary SRR instance
). For any P ⊆ R and any routing f for I, we often consider
as the sum of It is worth noting that the equation l b P (f ) = ||P || b always holds, though in contrast the integer l a P (f ) may be smaller or bigger than or equal to ||P || a . So for any routing f we particularly have
When P (⊆ R) is a path, complementary to it is the other pathP ⊆ R whose edge-disjoint union with P forms R. In particular, we will make explicit or implicit use of the following equations in our discussion:
Throughout the paper, we denote by f ▽ = {Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q k } a given non-Nash routing for the SRR
) in which players 1, 2, . . . , k are named such that for a minimum j with
. . , Q k } is a Nash routing for I, and
IfQ p = Q q for some p, q with 1 ≤ p ̸ = q ≤ j, then without loss of generality {p, q} = {j − 1, j}; it follows
This contradicts the minimality of j, and gives
By (2.7), we see from
Since R is the edge-disjoint union of Q i andQ i for every i = 1, 2, . . . , k, from (2.6), with R in place of P , we derive
Applying (2.4) to the Nash routing f
With the definition of M (f N ) given by (2.3), an easy case analysis on (2.12) shows that M (f N ) is bounded above by 1 2
which, in combination with (2.11), gives
Note from (2.11) and (2.12) that
Thus the leftmost inequality in (2.13) implies
These inequalities suggest an approach to upper bounding M (f N ): getting an estimation of the smallest
is not large, which constitutes the essence of the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4 If positive numbers β and ρ satisfy
, and β > ρ, then the following hold:
, which in combination of (2.8) implies (i):
To prove (ii), we deduce from (2.13) that l
− ||R|| which can be expressed using (2.6) as
By applying (2.7) and substituting ||R|| a − ||Q i || a for ||Q i || a , i = 1, 2, . . . , j, in the above inequality we
Rearranging terms in the above inequality yields
Since β/ρ > 1, ignoring the nonnegative middle term on the right-hand side and dividing both sides by positive number β/ρ + 1, we derive from the above inequality that
Let us now consider sum
Clearly, the sum of the contributions is at least
and thus at least l
On the other hand, since R is the link-disjoint union of Q 1 andQ 1 , we have
In turn, using (2.15) and ||R|| a = (γ + 1)||Q 1 || a in (2.10), we can lower bound l ā Q1
(f N ) as follows:
Furthermore, it follows from (2.16) that
Applying (2.12) and (2.6), we have
Combining the above inequality with (2.17) and using
Thus we obtain
which is equivalent to the inequality in (ii). The lemma is then proved. 2
Proof. Assume to the contrary β > 16. With ρ = 4, we deduce from Lemma 2.4 that
Note from (2.18) that βγ − β − 8 > 0, and from (2.10) that
With (2.14) we get
As γ > 0 by (2.18), the derivative of
2(βγ−β−8) with respect to β is negative for all β > 0. So, using β > 16, we obtain
32γ−48 > 16 implies γ < 3.52, a contradiction to (2.18), proving the lemma. 2
Tighter bounds on the prices of stability
This section is devoted to the establishment of the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 The price of stability of the SRR problem is at most 3.9 and is at most 3.5 if the linear latency functions are homogenous.
To establish Theorem 3.1, we are to use a number of lemmas and theorems. Suppose we are given a
) and f ▽ is not a Nash routing.
Therefore, some player h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} can benefit from unilaterally changing his strategy provided strategies of other players remain the same. It follows that the SRR instance admits a routing
follows from (2.7) and (3.1) that
In the rest of this section we denote by f N an arbitrary Nash routing for the instance I.
. We are to show β ≤ 3.9 for general linear latencies and β ≤ 3.5 for homogeneous latencies. To this end, we assume that
on which we derive a contradiction in either case. Since f N ̸ = f ▽ , we may assume that f N and f ▽ are as described in Section 2.3. Observe from (3.2) and (3.4) that Lemma 2.4 applies with ρ = 1, yielding
The combination of (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5) implies
Proof. Recall that player h has the incentive to change his strategy Q h in f ▽ toQ h (see (3.1) and the paragraph preceding it). The linearity of the latency functions and (3.2) give
from which l a R (f N ) can be bounded above by using the maximality of γ defined in (2.8), and by distinguishing between two cases:
If h > j, we can similarly obtain
The proof is then finished. 2
Based on (3.1)-(3.7) and Lemma 3.1, we establish Theorem 3.1 with two stronger statements in Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 below, the former dealing with the case of homogeneous latencies, and the latter general linear latencies.
Theorem 3.2 Given any routing f for an SRR instance with homogeneous linear latency functions, either f is a Nash routing, or
Proof. In the case of homogeneous linear latency functions, || · || = || · || a holds, subscript and superscript a can be dropped, and everything with subscript or superscript b is 0. If the theorem is not true, then
we must have f = f ▽ as a non-Nash routing, and a Nash routing f N as studied above. From Lemma 3.1
Recall from (3.7) that γ > 2.5. Thus the combination of (3.8) and (3.4) implies
So βγ − β − 2 > 0 is a positive number. Using it to divide both sides of the inequality in (3.6), we obtain
||R||.
by (2.14) and ||Q 1 || = ||R|| γ+1 by (2.10), we obtain
By (3.9), both βγ and (γ − 2)(βγ − β − 2) are positive numbers. Observe that the coefficients of ||R|| in (3.8) and (3.10) are negative and positive, respectively. Let us multiply both sides of (3.8) by βγ, multiply both sides of (3.10) by (γ − 2)(βγ − β − 2), and put the two resulting inequalities together. As a result, we can cancel the terms involving ||R||, and get
which is true since both βγ 2 − 2βγ − 2γ + 2β + 4 and M (f ▽ ) are positive as implied by (3.9) and (3.1) respectively. Observe that the right hand side of the above inequality has both numeration and
into the above inequality, we have
Notice from (3.9) that γ 2 − 2γ + 2 > 0, we obtain
Consider the expression on the right hand side of the above inequality as a function λ(γ) of variable γ ∈ (3.5, ∞) (recalling (3.9)). The unique root of λ ′ (γ) = 0 in (3. 
, we get an analogue to (3.8):
Since γ > 1 by (3.7) and β = M (f N )/M (f ▽ ) by (3.4), the inequality in (3.11) further enables us to work on the following (from which we will derive a contradiction):
Hence βγ − β − 2 is positive, which allows us to divide both sides of the inequality in (3.6) by βγ − β − 2, and obtain
It follows from (2.14) that
Notice from (3.12) that
||R|| a .
Recalling
Let us multiply both sides of (3.11) by positive number βγ, multiply both sides of (3.13) by positive number (γ − 1)(βγ − β − 2), and then add the resulting inequalities together. The terms involving ||R|| a vanish, so we arrive at
, the above inequality is equivalent to
Dividing both sides of the inequality by the positive number M (f ▽ ) (recall (3.1)), we get
The unique root of λ ′ (γ) = 0 in interval (2.9, ∞) (recalling (3.12)) is γ . = 2.46, at which λ(γ) attains a local maximum 3.89. It follows that β < 3.9, a contradiction to (3.12). The theorem is established. 2
Putting an optimal routing in place of f in Theorems 3.2 and 3.3, we immediately obtain the following corollary, which strengthens Theorem 3.1. Proof. Consider an arbitrary Nash routing f N for an SRR instance
). For any subgraphs P and Q of the ring R, by P ∪ Q (resp. P ∩ Q) we mean the subgraph of R with node set
. Clearly I admits an optimal routing f * that is irredundant in the sense that any two paths P, Q ∈ f
. It suffices to show β ≤ 16. To this end, we may assume
, as otherwise β = 1 and we are done.
If someQ g andQ h with 1 ≤ g < h ≤ j are link-disjoint, then Q g ∪ Q h = R, and since f ▽ is irredundant, it must be the case thatQ g = Q h andQ h = Q g , a contradiction to (2.9). Hence
With (2.11), we may assume
For the Nash routing f N , we deduce from (2.12) and (4.2) that
It is not difficult to see from (4.1) and (4.4) that one of the following three cases (illustrated in Figure 3 ) must be true:
Case 1: There exist p, q, and r with 1
Case 2: There exist p and q with 1 ≤ p < q ≤ j such thatQ p ∪Q q = R.
Case 3: There exist p and q with 1
Our case analysis goes as follows:
Hence Lemma 2.5 guarantees β ≤ 16 as desired. 
Observe that R is the link-disjoint union of Q p , Q q andQ p ∩Q q , implying
so we have
which, together with lQ
Case 3. In this case
is the link-disjoint union of Q p ∩ Q q and a subpath ofQ p , we derive from (4.3) that
Notice that
We are now able to conclude that β ≤ 16 in all cases, which establishes Theorem 4.1. 2
Better evaluation of instability
The instance in Figure 2 (c) with 0 < ε < 0.5 has the property that its unique optimal routing is a 4−ε 4−2ε -approximate Nash routing. This instability ratio approaches 7 6 as ε → 0.5. One natural question is: Shall the instability ratio grow infinitely when all SRR instances are taken into account? A negative answer has been provided in [9] that every SRR instance possess an optimal routing that approximates a Nash routing within a factor of 54. The gap between 7 6 and 54 is large, and it is substantially narrowed down by the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1
The SRR problem admits a (9, 1)-approximate Nash routing.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary instance
) on ring R = (V, E). For any two ordered nodes u, v ∈ V , let R [u, v] denote the clockwise path in R from u to v. To simplify description, let us shrink any e ∈ E with a e + b e = 0 into a node, which obviously has no effect on our result. The preprocessing reduces us to the setting in which (C1) a e + b e > 0 for all e ∈ E. 
from f * by replacing Q i withQ i and Q j withQ j , is optimal, and it can be deduced from condition (C1) and the definition of Φ in (2.5) that Φ(f ) < Φ(f * ), a contradiction to the minimality of Φ(f * ). Hence
For each player i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, let routing f i be obtained from f * by replacing Q i withQ i . Suppose without loss of generality that
To prove the theorem, we are to show that f * is a (9, 1)-approximate Nash routing for I. To this end, we assume to the contrary that f * is not. By definition 2.2, we see from (C4) that
It follows from inequality (C5) and Theorem 2.
The minimality of Φ(f (C6) Nodes s 1 , s 2 , t 1 and t 2 are distinct, and located on R in clockwise order (see Figure 4(a) ). Hence
by the string of inequalities in (C5). As Figure 4(a-b) shows, the intersection of Q 1 and Q 2 is the path R[s 2 
with respect to f 1 , which equals
by (C6) and (C5), we see from (C1) that (C7)
Let two sub-multisets S and T of the multiset {Q i : i = 1, 2, . . . , k} be defined as follows (see Figure   4 (a) for illustrations of positions of s i , t i , s j , t j ):
It is clear from property (C6) and
Consider Q i ∈ S and Q j ∈ T . Observe from (C2) and (C6) that
can be seen that
, and
Suppose some
with (C1) and (C4) enforces
with (C1) and
This fact, in combination of (C8), (C9), (C3) and (C6), implies (C10) S ∩ T = ∅, and for any paths Q i ∈ S and Q j ∈ T , their intersection By (C10), and the nonemptyness of S and T stated in (C8), we can take Q g ∈ S and Q h ∈ T such Figure 4 (c)). Properties (C9) and (C10) give rise to
Let routing f be obtained from f * by replacing Q g withQ g and Q h withQ h (see Figure 4(d) ). Using properties (C11) and (C6) and comparing among routings f , f * and f 1 (cf. Figure 4(d-c-b) ) lead to
Due to (C5) and (C7), both lQ 1 (f 1 ) and l R[s1,s2] (f * ) are smaller than
With (2.5), it is not hard to see from Figure 4 
Then the first inequality and the second inclusion stated in (C11) yield
We distinguish between two cases, depending on whether q belongs to {g, h} or not. 
By the second inequality in (C11) and inequality (C12), both
, which is absurd.
Case 2: q ̸ ∈ {g, h}. Then player q adopts the same strategy Q q in both f * and f . Comparing f and
The contradiction in either case disproves the assumption that f * is not a (9, 1)-approximate Nash routing. The theorem is established. 2
Fast search for good Nash routings
Given an SRR instance
) as an input, there is no loss of generality in assuming n ≤ 2k, and W = max e∈E (a e + b e ) is an integer at least 2 (recall (2.1) ). The number of bits in the binary representation of I is Ω(k + n log W ), which is considered as the input size of the instance. Let opt denote the maximum latency of an optimal routing for I. We first device an O(nk 3 ) time algorithm to find a routingf for I with M (f ) ≤ 3 opt, then fromf we reach a Nash routing f in O(nk 3 W ) time.
This convergence time improves upon the one in [9] by a factor of n, and is achieved by exploiting the unique structural property of the ring topology.
Data structure and subroutines
In our algorithmic implementations, the nodes v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n of R = (V, E) are ordered in cyclic order.
The source s i and destination t i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k, are input in terms of v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n . Fix the clockwise direction of R to be the one along which v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n can be encountered in this order. Recalling (2.2), suppose without loss of generality that P i (resp.P i ) is a clockwise (resp. counterclockwise) path in R from s i to t i , i = 1, 2, . . . , k. We associate (record) each path P in the multiset P = ∪ k i=1 {P i ,P i } with a unique integer π(P ) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2k} by putting π(P i ) := 2i − 1, π(P i ) := 2i, i = 1, 2, . . . , k. In this way, given π(P ) with P ∈ P, we can deduced that P is a clockwise (resp. counterclockwise) path in R from s ⌊
⌋ , when π(P ) is odd (resp. even).
(6.1)
of integers in stead of the node-sequence representations of these paths.
We call a path in R with end nodes s and t an s-t path. A link in E is often considered a path in
R.
A path in R is nontrivial if it has at least one link. Let P ⊆ R be a nontrivial v i -v j path, where
, where the additions and subtractions on subscripts are taken modulo n. In the former case, P does not contain the link v n v 1 ∈ E, |E(P )| = j − i, and P is said to be of type I. In the latter case, v n v 1 ∈ E(P ), |E(P )| = n − j + i, and P is said to be of type II. Hence, Given σ(P ) for any path P in R, both |E(P )| and the type of P are determined in O(1) time. (6.2) Moreover, given σ(P ), the node-sequence representation of P can be produced in O(n) time.
From (6.1) it is easy to see that, given π(P ) for P ∈ P, it takes O(1) time to produce σ(P ). So, by preprocessing, we obtain in O(k) time all σ(P ), P ∈ P. Clearly, this O(k) time does not count in the time complexity O(nk 3 ) and O(nk 3 W ) to be established in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. Particularly, array Σ has been set up to bind π(P ) and σ(P ) together for P ∈ P in way of
Given π(P ) for P ∈ P, from either (6. 
Proof. By (6.3) and Lemma 6.2, for every j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, either e ∈ Q j or e ̸ ∈ E(Q j ) is checked in O (1) time. Thus in O(nk) time we get all f e ′ , e ′ ∈ E, which enables us to compute 3 ) time 
3-approximation to the optimal routing in O(nk
Hence for any
h by the maximality in (6.5). In short, Q * i is uniquely determined byŌ h (in essence by h) for any i ∈ S.
(6.8)
Now for any i ∈ T , we observe from (6.6) that Q * i uses links from both E(Q *
) for all i, j ∈ T , which assures the existence of a maximal subpath Λ ofQ * h = O h that is nontrivial and link-disjoint from all path Q * i , i ∈ T . By (6.9) we see that Λ is a u j -u j+1 path in O h for some 0 ≤ j ≤ |T |, and all Q * i , i ∈ T , are determined by Λ. (6.10) Thus the combination of (6.8) and (6.10) gives f * .
To summarize, we make a number of "guesses", and pick the best outcome as an approximation to the optimal routing. Our guesses, held in a set F, include f
. . , O k }, and routing f (as a guess of f * ) with respect to every h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} and every possible Λ ⊆ O h , in view of (6.5), (6.6), (6.8) and (6.10). In total we have at most 1 + k(k − 1) ≤ k 2 guesses, each of which is a routing put in F as specified in the following pseudocode.
) with minimum maximum latency opt. Output: A routingf for I with M (f ) ≤ 3 opt.
f
end-for
10
.
end-for
16. Takef 
Therefore, it follows from (2.3) and (2.4) that f under investigation is not a Nash routing if and only if
NR Alg finds (by implementing
Step 10 a certain number of times) some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} for which the condition in Step 6 is satisfied, where by (6.4) searching for this i accomplishes in O(k) time. In addition, recalling (2.1) and Lemma 2.1(i), the integrality of M i (f ) and The pseudo-polynomial runtime of NR Alg is complemented in some sense by the PLS-completeness 
Empirical study and concluding remarks
In this section we undertake some empirical study on the SRR, and then conclude the paper with remarks on future research.
Empirical study
Our empirical investigations on the SRR of two and three players algorithmically lead us to the following more accurate evaluation of the PoS. For i = 1, 2, . . . , 2k, we write the nonnegative numbers a ei and b ei , which define the latency function l ei (x) = a ei x + b ei on e i , as a i and b i , respectively. In illustration, let us indicate s 1 , t 1 (resp. s 2 , t 2 ) by disks (resp. squares), and indicate s 3 , t 3 by solid pentagons when k = 3. Figure 5 exhausts all combinations of positions of source-destination pairs on the ring R (up to renaming players and swapping source and destination of the same player): cases (a') and (b') for 2-player SRR, and cases 
